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EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTING BETWEEN HOSPITALS
AND PHYSICIANS AND THE USE OF
ECONOMIC CREDENTIALING
DavidJ.Behinfafr
INTRODUCTION
The transformation of health care delivery systems over the past several
decades has placed increasing economic demands on hospitals that have
responsively altered the way they conduct business, especially in the area
of medical staffing decisions.' The economic pressures fostering these
changes include rising cost of health care, changing patient population,
reduced government reimbursement for Medicare and Medicaid patients
and pay or reform.2 Liability exposure has also played an important role
in redefining how hospitals operate
Many hospitals enter into exclusive contracts with a physician or
group of physicians in response to these economic challenges.4 In such
agreements, the physician or physician group is designated as the exclusive
provider of a specified service within the hospital, such as radiology or
anaesthesia with the result that other physicians are precluded from

*Associate,Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Priess, Wheaton, IL.BA, University of Co!oradoJ.D., Southern Methodist University, 1994; LLAM in Health Law, DePaul University, 19%6
1 Teresa Hudson, Factoring in the Financial Courts Give Nod to Economic
Credentialling, HOSPITALS, Apr. 5, 1993, at 3S.
2
Id.
3
Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.S2d 656 (1957) (eliminating hospital immunity and applying the
principle ofrespondeat superior to physician-employees of hospital); Jackson v. Power, 743 P2d 1376
(Alaska 1987) (hospital has nondelegable duty to provide non-negligent phy:ician care in Itz
emergency room and hospital may be liable for breach of this duty); Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. He-p,.
622 N.E.2d 788 (1. 1993) (hospital may be liable for negligent act of a phyzician even if phy.zican
is an independent contractor so long as an apparent agency relationship e:dzt,),
A hospital may also be liable for the negligent hiring of a physician v,ho commit:; neghgcnt
actsh
viule an employee of the hospital. See Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211
NE.2d 253 (111.
1965), cerL denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966) (hospital has a duty to exierci:a reazonab!e
care in the selection of its employee physicians). This duty was expanded in Johnson v Micarieirdia
CommunityHosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (wis. 1981) and Elam v. College Park Hosp,, 183 Cal, Rplr, 156
(1982) (where both cases held a hospital has a duty to carefully review a physicians qualifications
upon application). See also Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E2d 788 (01, 1983)
See Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 653 N.E2d 42 (Ill,
1995); Dutta v. St Francis Regional
Medical Ctr., Inc., 254 Kan. 690 (1994); Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A2d 1020 (Me.
1992); Lewisburg Community Hosp., Inc. v. Alfiedson, 805 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1991).
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performing those services at the same hospital.' The impact of these
hospital-physician exclusive contracts is potentially devastating to staffphysicians who are not included within the agreement. Unless the
contracted group chooses to employ a particular staff-physician, once an
exclusive contract goes into effect, the staff physician is no longer able to
perform similar services at the hospital and his or her staff privileges

become meaningless. As a result, staff-physicians who do not enjoy
exclusive contracts have, with increasing frequency, sought judicial relief
for their exclusion6 basing a cause of action on violations of hospital bylaw
provisions' that require notice and a hearing for actions affecting the staff
privileges of physicians.8
This article will review the courts' posture towards physician-hospital

contractual relationships, and develop a rationale for avoiding such
disputes and clarifying parties' contractual rights and obligations. The first
section analyzes the legal issues surrounding exclusive contracts and the
termination of staff privileges. The next section provides advice on
drafting individual contracts and hospital bylaws. Finally, this article

delineates strategies for avoiding problems associated with hospitals'
attempts to enter into exclusive contracts, and provide an example of how

physicians and hospitals have worked together to solve the problems
associated with exclusive contracting.
LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS
AND THE TERMINATION OF STAFF PRIVILEGES FOR
ECONOMIC REASONS

See Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 653 N.E.3d 42 (Bl. 1995); Dutta v. St. Francis Regional
Medical Ctr., 254 Kan. 690 (1994); Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d 1020 (Me.
1992); Lewisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1991).
6
See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 653 N.E2d 42 (Ill. 1995); Dutta v. St, Francis Regional
Medical Ctr., 254 Kan. 690 (1994); Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d 1020 (Me.
1992); Lewisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1991).
7
See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 653 NE.2d 42 (111.1995); Dutta v. St. Francis Regional
Medical Ctr., 254 Kan. 690 (1994); Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d 1020 (Me.
1992); Lewisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1991).
8
See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 653 N.E2d 42 (11. 1995); Dutta v. St, Francis Regional
Medical Ctr., 254 Kan. 690 (1994); Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d 1020 (Me.
1992); Lewisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1991).
5
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Increasingly, physicians are forced to seek legal remedies when a hospital
adversely affects their staff privileges through the use of exclusive
contracts. However, courts are not always receptive toward the
complaining physician with the overwhelming majority of courts finding
that a private hospital has a right to deny staff privileges to a physician.'
Hence, courts will not normally review a private hospital's decision
regarding the denial of a physician's initialapplicationfor staff privileges."
The general rule of refusing to provide judicial review is based on the
premise that it is inappropriate for a court to substitute its own judgment
for the professional judgement of hospital officials who have superior
qualifications in making medical staffing decisions.' Therefore, courts will
only inquire as to whether a hospital's denial of an applicant's staff
privileges followed proper procedure. 2 To adhere to proper procedure,
a hospital need follow only its own governing documents when denying
staff privileges to physicians. Consequently, courts involve themselves
only when there is evidence of a conspiracy between the hospital's board
and other physicians who have staff privileges, or if there is a departure
from standards set by hospital bylaws. 3
While the staffing decisions of hospitals can be free from judicial
review when they deny applicants admittance to the medical staff, courts
take a different view when hospitals seek to reduce the existing staff

9
Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 222 F. Supp. 59 (DD.C, 1963) (stting pnvate
hospital has right to exclude any physician from practicing at that hospital). The llinois Supreme
Court in Barrows v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 123 Ill. 2d 49 (1988) noted that public policy
supported the nonreviewability of staff privilege decisions by private hospitals in dcning initial staff
applications. The court stated that the large majority of states do not provide for review of a hospital's
decisions on medical staffing. Only Arizona, California, Hawaii, New Hampshire, Vermont and New,:
Mexico employ a broader scope of review. Consequently, physicians do not enjoy a fight to practice
at a private hospital.
10 Barrows v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 123 Ill. 2d 49, 52 (1938); Knapp v Palos
Community Hosp., 125 Ill. App. 3d 244,465 (1984); Mauer v. Highland Park Hosp. Found, 90 111,
App. 2d 409,412 (1967).
Adkins v. Sarah Lincoln Bush Health Ctr., 158 Ill. App. 3d 982 (1987).
12
Knapp v. Palos Community Hosp., 176 Iil. App. 3d 1012, 1018 (198) (pnvate hoapital
must follow its own bylaws when revoking a physician's staff privileges or the decision is subject to
judicial review); see also Yamell v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., 446 N E2d 359 (Ind.
App. 1983); Lapidot v. Memorial Medical Ctr., 144 l. App. 3d 141, 147 (1986).
13
Knapp, 176 11. App. 3d at 1018.
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privileges of a physician. 14 When a hospital reduces staff privileges
-previously granted to a physician, courts allow full judicial review to
determine whether the action was proper."
Courts not only review actions that expressly reduce a physician's
staff privileges, they also provide for review when staff privileges are
constructively terminated. 6 Constructive termination occurs when a
physician has privileges at a hospital and the hospital enters into an
exclusive contract with a physician group. If the individual physician who
formerly held staff privileges is not employed by the new physician group,
his or her staff privileges are useless due to the fact that he or she can no
longer use the hospital's facilities. This is considered a "constructive
termination" because the hospital did not directly terminate or reduce the
physician's staff privileges. 7

In summary, legal relief is not available for a physician seeking
appointment to a hospital staff whose application is denied, unless the
hospital failed to conform to its own procedural requirements in denying
the application. However, when a hospital reduces, terminates or
constructively terminates the existing staff privileges of a physician, full
judicial review is available to the physician.
The Contractual Relationship Between
Physician and Hospital
Once a physician demonstrates termination or constructive termination of
his existing staff privilges, he has overcome the first hurdle and will be
allowed to have a court determine the propriety of the hospital's actions.
The next step is predicated upon determining the legal relationship between
the parties; this inquiry is directed toward determining the contractual
relationship between hospital and physician. Therefbre, the first

14

Id.

is

Id.

16

17

Id.

See Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 653 N.E.3d 42 (Il. 1995); Dutta v. St. Francis Regional
Medical Ctr., 254 Kan. 690 (1994); Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A2d 1020 (Me.
1992); Lewisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, 805 S.V.2d 756 (Tenn. 1991).
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substantive issue a court will address is whether the hospital bylaws
created any contractual rights."

When a hospital agrees to grant staff privileges to a physician, it
enters into an individual contract with that physician.1 9 This contract
defines the rights of the parties with respect to the physician's use of

hospital facilities.20 For example, a physician might be restricted from
providing services at other hospitals, or be obligated to perform a specified
number of services at the contracting hospital.21 This individual contract
clearly binds both the physician and the hospital.
In addition, courts have found that hospital bylaws also constitute part
of the contractual agreement between physician and hospital.' Thus, in

most states, the individual contract and the hospital bylaws act together to

18

See Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 653 N.E.3d 42 (11. 1995); Dutta v,St. Francis Regional

Medical Ctr., 254 Kan. 690 (1994); Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A2d 1020 (0e.
1992); Lewisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W2d 756 (Tenn. 1991).
19
See Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 653 N.E.3d 42 (11. 1995); Dutta %.St Francis Regtonal
Medical Ctr., 254 Kan. 690 (1994); Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr,, 617 A2d 1020 (M.
1992); Lewisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.12d 756 (Tenn, 1991),
20
See Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 653 N.E.3d 42 (11. 1995); Dutta v. St Francis Regional
Medical Ctr., 254 Kan. 690 (1994); Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 AN2d 1020 (.1e.
1992); Lewisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, 805 S.2d 756 (Tenn. 1991).
21
See Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 653 N.E.3d 42(111. 1995); Dutta v. St Francis Regional
Medical Ctr., 254 Kan. 690 (1994); Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A2d 1020 (Me.
1992); Lewisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, S05 S.Wl.2d 756 (Tenn 1991).
22 See, e.g., Fahey v. Holy Family Hosp., 32 I1. App. 3d 537, 543 (1975); Pari:r v.
Christian Health Care ys., Inc., 816 F.2d 1248,1251 (Sth Cir. 1987); Lcvisburg Community Hop.,
Inc., v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1991); Gianetti v. Norwalk Ho:p,, 211 Conn. 51, 64
(1989); Lawlerv. Eugene WestoffMemorial Hosp. Ass'n, 497 So. 2d 1261,1264 (Fla. DiUt CL App
1986); Posner v. Lankenau Hosp., 645 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
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define the contractual relationship between the parties. 2 Hospitals must
act in accordance with their bylaws to remain free from judicial review.24
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO) standards require certain hospital bylaw provisions to provide
for notice and a hearing for a member-physician when the hospital acts to
suspend or terminate the physician's staff privileges. 25

As a result,

numerous suits have been predicated on a hospital's denial of notice
or a
26
hearing before staff privileges are "constructively terminated.1

However, it is notable that some courts have held hospital bylaws to
be ineffectual in contractually binding a hospital and physician. 7 In St.
Mary's Hospitalv. Radiology ProfessionalCorp.,2' and Szczerbaniuk v.
MemorialHospitalforMcHenry County, 9 the hospitals both successfully

argued that bylaws do not create an enforceable contract between the

23 Illinois: Fahey v. Holy Family Hosp., 32 Ill.
App. 3d 537, 543 (1975); Tennessee:
Lewisburg Comm. Hosp., Inc., v. Alfredson, 805 S.W. 2d 756 (Tenn. 1991); Connecticut: Gianetti
v. Norwalk Hosp., 557 A.2d 1249 (Conn. 1989); Pennsylvania: Posner v. Lankenau Hosp., 645 F.
Supp. 1102,1106 (E.D. Pa. 1986): Florida: Lawler v. Eugene WesthoffMem. Hosp. Ass'n, 497 So.
2d 1261, 1264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); South Dakota: St. John's Hosp. Medical Staff v. St. John
Regional Medical Ctr., Inc., 90 S.D. 674 (1976); Maine: Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617
A.2d 1020 (Me. 1992); Ohio: Holt v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 69 Ohio App. 3d 439
(1990).4
24
Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 222 F. Supp.
59 (D.D.C. 1963) (stating private
hospital has right to exclude any physician from practicing at that hospital). The Illinois Supreme
Court in Barrows v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 123 Ill.
2d 49 (1988) noted that public policy
supported the nonreviewability of staff privilege decisions by private hospitals in denying initial staff
applications. The court stated that the large majority of states do not provide for review of a hospital's
decisions on medical staffing. Only Arizona, California, Hawaii, New Hampshire, Vermont and New
Mexico employ a broader scope of review. Consequently, physicians do not enjoy a right to practice
at a private hospital. Barrows, 123 Ill.
2d at 52; Knapp v. Palos Community Ho,-p., 125 Ill.
App. 3d
244,465 (1984); Mauer v. Highland Park Hosp. Found., 90 Il.
App. 2d 409,412 (1967).
25 Standards MS._ -MS_, 1995 JCAHO ACCREDITATION MANUAL.
26 See Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 653 N.E.3d 42 (Il. 1995); Dutta v. St. Francis Regional
Medical Ctr., 254 Kan. 690 (1994); Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d 1020 (Me.
1992); Leisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1991).
27 See Manezur v. Southside Hosp., 183 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1959) (bylaws and hospital
constitution did not suffice as requirements of mutuality of obligations and considsration so breach of
contract action was not proper); see also e.g., Leider v. Beth Israel Hosp. Assoc., 182 N.E.2d 393
(N.Y.App 1962); Medical/Dental Staff of St. John's Episcopal Hosp. v. Board of Managers, No.813793 (N2.Y. Sup. Ct., June 22, 1981).
29
St. Mary's Hosp. of Athens v. Radiology Professional Corp., 421 S.E. 2d 731 (1992).
29
Szczerbaniuk v.MemorialHosp. for MeHenry County, 180 IIl. App. 3d 706, 713 (1989).
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physician and hospital." In Szczerbaniuk, the court's decision was based
on the existence of a detailed individual contract between the physician and
the hospital that conflicted with the hospital's bylaws."1 In St. Mary's,the
court determined that since the hospital had the authority to revise the
rules and regulations governing physicians, the bylaws did not create any
contractual rights.32
While St. Mary's and Szczerbaniuk support the proposition that
bylaws may not bind physicians and hospitals, a consistent trend is
emerging as courts find that parties are contractually bound by bylaw
terms.33

Staff Privilgesvs. ClinicalPrivileges:When are they terminated?
Because bylaws often act to contractually bind parties, the notice and
hearing provisions of bylaws must be adhered to in any actions reducing,
adversely affecting, or terminating a physician's staff prvileges. Therefore,
the question courts now face is whether physicians, who are not part of the
physician group exclusively contracted with by the hospital, have had their
staff privileges reduced, adversely affected or terminated by that exclusive
contract.
The fact pattern routinely seen in these cases consists of a situation
where a hospital grants staff privileges to a physician to provide a
designated service at the hospital. Later, the hospital enters into an
exclusive contract with a physician group whereby members of that group
are to be the sole providers of the designated service at that hospital.'
Meanwhile, the hospital often fails to give the staff physician notice or a

30

St. Mary's Hosp. of Athens v. Radiology Professional Corp, 421 SE, 2d 731 (1992);

Szczerbaniuk v. Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County, 180 Ill App. 3d 706,713 (19S9).
31
Szczerbaniuk, 1SO Ill. App. 3dat714.
St Mary's,421 S.E.2d at 736.
32
33 See, e.g., Garibaldi v.Applebaum, 653 N.E2d42 (1L1995); Dutta v. St Franci3 Regional
Medical Ctr., 254 Kan. 690 (1994); Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A2d 1020 (Me,
1992); Lewisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, 805 S.12d 756 (Tenn. 1991).
34 See, e g., Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 653 N.E2d 42 (I1. 1995); Dutta v. St Francis Regional
Medical Ctr., 254 Kan. 690 (1994); Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 Ad 1020 (Me,
1992); Lewisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W2d 756 (Tenn. 1991).
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hearing on the matter.3 5 Finally, the individual physician may file suit
against the hospital claiming the notice and hearing procedures were not
followed as required by the hospital bylaws for actions reducng, adversely
affecting or terminating a physician's staff or clinical privile;-es 6
In Garibaldiv. Applebaum,3 7 a recent case decided by the Illinois
Court of Appeals, the court addressed the above scenario and held that by
entering into an exclusive contract, the hospital adversely affected the
clinical privileges previously granted to plaintiff physician, and therefore
had violated bylaw provisions requiring notice and a hearing,.8
39 the determining factor
In several cases, including Garibaldi,
concerning whether a hospital rightfully or wrongfully failed to provide a
staff physician with notice or a hearing, rested upon whether the hospital
had granted staff privileges or clinical privileges. Various courts have
recognized a distinction between staff privileges and clinical privileges,
which are also referred to as "the right to use the staff privileges."4"
Staff privileges have been interpreted by courts as a minimum
standard; however, they are insufficient alone to permit the physician to
actually provide services at the hospital.41 Clinical privileges, on the other
hand, actually give the physician the right to perform services at the
hospital when used in conjunction with staff privileges.42
This distinction between clinical privileges and staff privileges has
allowed courts to find that exclusive contracting affects the clinical
privileges of a physician, by restricting his or her ability to practice at a
hospital, but not the physician's staff privileges. Thus, a hospital avoids the

35 See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 653 N.E2d 42 (1.1995); Dutta v. St. Francis Regional
Medical Ctr., 254 Kan. 690 (1994); Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d 1020 (Mc.
1992); Lewisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1991).
36 See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 653 N.E2d 42 (1il. 1995); Dutta v. St. Francis Regional
Medical Ctr., 254 Kan. 690 (1994); Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d 1020 (Mo.
1992); Lewisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1991).
3
Garibaldi,653 N.E.2d 42.
38

Id., at 45.

39
40
41

Id. at44.
See cases cited supra note 6.
Engelstad v. Virginia Miin. Hosp. & Va. Hosp. Comm., 718 F.2d 262,267-268 (8th Cir.

1983); Lewisbury Comm. Hosp. Inc., v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.2d 756,760 (Tenn. 1991).
42
Engelstad,718 F.2d at 262,267-268; Lewisbury, 805 S.W.2d at 760.
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necessity of providing a physician with notice or a hearing.43 The result of
this distinction is that a physician may have staff privileges at a hospital,
but is unable to perform any services at that hospital.
Nevertheless, this difference can serve the interests of either party,
depending upon the inclination of the reviewing court. For example, in
Garibaldi,the court found the plaintiffs staff privileges were unaffected
by the exclusive contract, but that the plaintiffs clinical privileges had been
constructively terminated as a result of the hospital's exclusive contract
with the physician group. In determining whether the plaintiff was entitled
to notice or a hearing, the court relied on provisions in the hospital bylaws
that specifically distinguished between staff privileges and clinical
privileges.' The court also relied on provisions in the hospital bylaws that
provided:45
Actions that limit, reduce, suspend or revoke membership or
clinical privileges of a practitioner of the staff of the Hospital or revoke
staffmembership shall be deemed to be adverse to the practitioner and
shall entitle the practitioner to notice and the hearing and appeal
procedures as provided in Article VIII. These actions include:

(2) Reduction, suspension or revocation of clinical privileges andlor
admitting privileges;
(4) Suspension or revocation of specific clinical privileges or staff
membership...
Thus, in Garibaldithe court found the plaintiff was entitled to notice
and hearing protections found in the bylaws. Based on this conclusion, the

43
44

45
46

See, e.g., Engelstad,718 F2d at 266.
Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 653 N.E2d 42,45 (11. 1995)
Id at 45.
Id. at 43.
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court reversed the lower court's summary4judgment
ruling for the hospital
7
and remanded the case to the trial court.
Similarly, in Bartley v. EasternMaineMedical Center,4 the Supreme
Court of Maine also recognized the distinction between the granting of
staff privileges and clinical privileges. However, the court came to a
conclusion opposite that of the Garibaldicourt. In Bartley, the hospital
did not provide the physicians with notice or a hearing and maintained that
the bylaws only required notice and a hearing when remedial or corrective
action affected the staff privileges of a physician.49 The Bartley court also
found the notice and hearing provisions in the bylaws to be applicable only
to "major corrective actions," defined in the bylaws as occurring when a
recommendation is made to reduce a physician's privileges.5" Because the
decision to contract exclusively with a group of physicians was based on
economic factors, the court concluded the hospital's decision was not
tantamount to a major corrective action." Accordingly, the court found
the provision inapplicable to the hospital's decision to enter into an
exclusive contract
which constructively terminated the physician's
2
privileges.1

The Bartley court also distinguished between the granting of
privileges and the right to use privileges.5" The court found the physician's
staff privileges were not reduced, because the grant of privileges did not
include the right to use those privileges. 4 Here, the distinction between
5
staff privileges and clinical privileges was not as explicit as in Garibaldi."
The hospital bylaws did not provide for any distinction between the two
types of privileges; therefore, the court pinpointed the distinction itself and
the differing protections for the two types of privileges. The court defined
staff privileges to mean the physicians were qualified to practice at the

47

48
49

Id. at 45.

Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d 1020 (Me. 1992).
Id. at 1023.

50
51
52
53

Id.
Id.
Id.

54

Id.

55

Id.

Bartley v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 617 A.2d 1020, 1023 (Me. 1992).
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hospital.56 However, the court's definition of staff privileges did not extend
to the right to use those privileges. Therefore, the court found the
exclusive contract with the physician group only affected the physicians'
right to use the staff privileges, and the bylaws did not require notice or a
hearing for actions that only affected the right to use those privileges.'
Finally, the court inBartley did not identify a contractual basis for its
distinction, nor did the court cite a provision in either the physician's
contract or the bylaws supporting the distinction between granting staff
privileges and the right to use such privileges. The court however did cite
two cases, Engelstad v. Virginia Min. Hosp. & Ma. Hosp. Comm.' and
Holt v. Good SamaritanHosp. & Health Ctr, 9 which both support a
distinction between the granting of staff privileges and the actual right to
use those privileges.6"
In both Engelstadand Holt, the legal analysis focused on the premise
that the grant of staff privileges did not include the right to use those
privileges.6 ' This reasoning permitted the court in both cases to conclude
that a physician who has staff privileges at a hospital would not necessarily
have the right to exercise those privileges.6" The court in Bartley applied
this same analysis as the foundation for determining that the exclusive
contract did not affect the physician's staff privileges, but only restricted
the right to use privileges not protected in the bylaws 3
Finally, in Dutta v. St. FrancisRegionalMedical Center,' an opinion
rendered by the Supreme Court of Kansas prior to Garibaldi,the court
rejected the notion that notice and a hearing must be provided even when
a physician's clinical privileges are affected. As in Garibaldi,the hospital

56

57

53
59
1990).60

Id. at 1022-1023.
Id. at 1023.
Engelstad v. Virginia Mun. Hosp., 718 F2d 262, 26S (Sth Cir. 1933),
Holt v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 590 NE2d 1318, 1323 (Ohio CL App,
Bartley v. Eastem ManeMedical Ctr., 617 Ad 1020, 1023 (Me 1992) (citing

Engelstad v. VMiginiaMun. Hosp., 718 F.2d 262, 268 (Sth Cir. 1983); Holt v. Goal S2maritan Hosp.
&Health Ctr., 590 N.E.2d 1318, 1323 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)).
61
Engelstad,718 F.2d at 268; Holt, 590 NE.2d at 1323.
62
Engelstad,718 F.2d at 268; Holt, 590 N.E2d at 1323.
63 Bartley, 617 A.2d at 1023.
64 Dutta v. St. Francis Regional Medical Ctr., 867 P.2d 1057 (Kan. 1994).
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bylaw6" provisions granted a hearing when a decision by the hospital
adversely affected the physician's status as a member of the medical staff
or the physician's clinical privileges." This is the same type of provision
the court in Garibaldiused to support its finding that the physician the has
a right to a hearing.67 Nevertheless, in Dutta,the court rendered a decision
in favor of defendant hospital.
In Dutta, plaintiff physician argued that her clinical privileges were
adversely affected by the hospital's decision to revoke her right to use the
hospital facilities and enter into an exclusive contract with another
radiologist. 8 Plaintiff also argued the bylaws required a hearing, because
the agreement had an adverse affect on plaintiffs clinical privileges." In
response, the hospital maintained that the grant of privileges did not
include the right to use those privileges, and referred to provisions in the
bylaws distinguishing between medical staff membership and clinical
privileges, the latter being merely a privilege and not a "right."0 ° The
hospital further argued it could deny plaintiff access to the hospital's
equipment without adversely affecting her staff privileges. 1
The Dutta court sided with the hospital holding that because the
hospital's decision to refuse plaintiff access to the hospital's equipment was
a business decision, plaintiff was not entitled to a hearing for the adverse
effect of the decision on her staff privileges. 72 The court remained
unpersuaded by the plaintiffs attempts to argue that her clinical privileges
had been reduced.

65

Durta, 867 P.2d at 1061. The bylaws also included that hearings are provided for the

purpose of deciding matters concerning the resolution of professional competency and conduct
matters.
66

Id.

67
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Economic Credentialing
To understand why courts have rendered such diverse opinions on similar
fact scenarios, and developed a transparent distinction between the
protection of staff privileges and clinical privileges, it is important to
understand the economic rationale behind staffing decisions. The legal
battle between a hospital and a physician is often the result of a hospital's
decision, based on economics and pure business motives, to exclusively
contract with a physician group.
Typically, hospitals enter into exclusive contracts with physician
groups for purely economic reasons.7 The term used to describe this
phenomenon is "economic credentialing".74 Economic credentialing refers
to the use of economic criteria, unrelated to quality of care or professional
competency, used by a hospital for determining a physician's qualifications
for initial or continuing medical staff privileges. 5 For example, a hospital
might consider factors such as a physician's ability to use the hospital
facilities and equipment in an efficient manner. Moreover, the hospital may
consider the physician's DRG profiles, patient services, admissions, and
levels ofreimbursement.76 Exclusive contracting has become a means for
hospitals to engage in economic credentialing, thereby maximizing
revenues while reducing costs.'
According to a 1989 survey conducted by the American Hospital
Association (AHA), 73.4 percent of the hospitals responding stated they

See generaI, Brian McCormick, Suing over Exclusivity: Courts Grappling with
Economic Credentialing;Physician-HospitalContractsBased on Economic Criteria,A. m%,cA
MEDICAL NEWS, Jan. 13, 1992 at 3; see also, Anita . Slomski, Hospitals WieldA Hcavy Club
AgainstHigh-CostDoctors;Economic Credentialing,hIEDIcALEcO.0Imc, Oct 7, 1991 at 57.
7
See generally, Brian McCormick, Suing over Exclusivity: Courts Grappling ith
Economic Credentialing Physician-HospitalContractsBased on Economic Criteria,A- aicx:
MEDICAL NEwS, Jan. 13, 1992 at 3; see also, Anita J. Slomski, HospitalsWield A Heavy Club
Agahbt High-CostDoctors;Economic Credcntialin,
g; MEDIcAL Eco:o.zc, Oct. 7,1991 at 57. See
also Brian McCormick, The Many FacesofEconomic Credentialing,A-vcx.MED cAL Navo,
July 20,1992 at 3; Neil Olderman, LegalAspects ofEconomic Credentialing,MIanagingMedical
Care Costs, P YSIciA ExctruVE Nov. 1991 at 19.
75 Id.
76 Id.
73

77

Id.

84

De PAUL JOURNTAL OFHEALTH CARE LA W

[Vol. 1:71

held exclusive contracts with their hospital departments. 78 The
departments that were most frequently exclusively contracted with were
radiology, pathology, emergency medicine and anesthesiology.79 A
hospital will generally offer quality of care reasons in support of their
decision to enter into exclusive contracts. However, physicians see the use
of exclusive contracting as a means of economic credentialing where the
hospital is making medical staffing decisions based on economic criteria
unrelated to the quality of patient care. 80
Several opinions have expressly recognized the hospital's use of
exclusive contracting for economic reasons as a viable propfietary interest
unhindered by hospital bylaws. For example, in Bartley, the hospital
argued the decision to exclusively contract with a group of physicians was
an economic decision, unrelated to quality of care. The hospital further
argued that these types of medical staffing decisions should not be subject
to the notice and hearing requirements found in the bylaws.8 The court
agreed holding the hospital board of trustees had the authority to act
irrespective ofthe bylaws in order to enter into new contracts3 and manage
the hospital.82 The court gave priority to the hospital's board of trustees,
and favored the hospital board's interest in the power to conduct business,
rather than the interests of physicians in notice and hearing provisions
found in the bylaws.8
In Dutta, the court embraced similar arguments by the hospital and
found the hospital's right to make business decisions regarding the medical
staffing of its departments took priority over a physician's rights as
expressed in the bylaws.84 In Garibaldi,however, the court either ignored
the economic stakes at hand, or was unaware of the economic indicia
behind the hospital's actions. In either event, the court simply looked to
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Id.
Id.
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the hospital's bylaws and found the notice and hearing protections reserved
for the physician had not been followed. 5
Garibaldi,Bartley and Dutta illustrate the difficulties courts face
when interpreting the contractual relationship between a physician and
hospital. The inconsistency of the decisions result from the courts' struggle
to weigh the physicians' interest in continued employment, against the
interests of the hospital in making medical staffing decisions. These
inconsistent holdings may also be explained by the lack of individual
contract provisions between hospitals and physicians regarding
termination.
DRAFTING CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES TO AVOID UNCERTAINMY

Consistency and clarity are both necessary in order to effectively draft
reliable bylaws and physician contracts. This section addresses some
points on drafting contracts that will help avoid potential dilemmas, and
also allow parties to better understand their legal rights and obligations
should the hospital enter into an exclusive contract with another physician
or physician group.
There are several steps both hospitals and physicians can take to
reduce the possibility of suits over termination provisions in hospital
bylaws and the applicability of those provisions to decisions based on
economic motives. There are two specific approaches toward drafting
such agreements. The first gives the physician more rights in an action
adversely affecting his or her privileges. The second gives the hospital
greater leeway to make medical staffing decisions without giving notice or
a hearing to the physician. 6 Drafting agreements that favor either side are
possible as well. However, as one commentator has noted, hospitals and
hospital-based physicians are inexorably intertwined in a relationship that
has common goals and objectives.8 7 The importance of the two parties
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finding a common ground on which to base future relations is necessary if
the two parties wish to remain allies rather than adversaries.88
To clarify the agreement between the hospital and physician, parties
must draft the contract with greater specificity. If there are straightforward
and specific provisions governing the rights of the parties upon
termination, the parties will be able to act within these rights.
Because courts have increasingly held hospital bylaws to contractually
bind parties to its provisions, the bylaws must also contain the relevant
revisions of clarity and specificity.89 There are several clauses the parties
might include in either the bylaws or the individual physician contract to
clarify their agreement.
Drafting With Specificity
One provision that can clarify the parties' rights is the clean sweep
provision.' A clean sweep provision in the physician's individual contract
with the hospital typically provides that in the event of the termination or
expiration of the agreement, the physician's privileges at the hospital will
also be terminated. 9 As part of the agreement, the physician is required
to waive his or her right to a hearing and must sign a written waiver in
order for the provision to be effective. 2 This provision allows the hospital
to terminate the contract without prolonging the process with a hearing.93
A California appellate court has found the clean sweep provision valid
holding that a physician may waive his or her rights to a hearing.94
While the hospital may benefit from this arrangement, the physician
does not appear to receive any additional benefits. Nevertheless, in return
for the hearing waiver, the physician might receive a higher salary or a six
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month to one year extended notification of termination provision in the
contract.95
Another way of incorporating the efficiency of the clean sweep
provision into the contract is simply to define the parties' rights upon
termination of the individual contract.' This termination provision should
distinguish between termination for cause and termination for economic
97
reasons.

Ifa physician is accused of doing an inadequate job then the hospital
should have the right to terminate his or her contract and his or her staff
privileges. The physician should also have the right to defend himself or
herself from the accusations; therefore, the physician should be entitled to
notice and a hearing. However, when a hospital wishes to reduce or
terminate the staff and clinical privileges of a physician for economic
reasons, a hearing could be waived by the physician in a separate
provision." The contract should also specify what economic reasons are
appropriate for termination. This will enable the physician to better protect
his or her position by monitoring these areas before they become
problematic.
The actions triggering a right to a hearing must also be clearly
defined.99 If hearings are proper only when considering a physician's
professional competency or conduct, then the parties must recognize that
economically motivated actions are not subject to a hearing.C If a
physician wishes to have a hearing when a hospital adversely affects his or
her staff or clinical privileges for economic reasons, the physician must
request the provision to be included in their individual contract.
Individual contracts and/or bylaws must also contain specific
definitions of clinical privileges and staff privileges. 1' The definition of
95
Howard Larldn, State Court Links Privilege Wit) Access To Hospital Facilities,
AmEPICANMEDIcALNEws, Apr. 15, 1991, at 9.
96 See June D. Zellers and Michael RL Poulin, Termination ofHospitalMedical
Staff
Privilegesfor Economic Reasons: an Appeal for Consistenc, 46 ME. L. REv. 67, 34 (1994)
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staff privileges should specifically include language on whether staff
privileges include the right to use those privileges. In addition, the
definition will restrict courts from redefining the agreement of the parties
in accordance with prior case law. Inclusion of such terms Will also force
courts to define the contractual relationship of the hospital and physician
based on the actual terms of the contract.
Finally, the hospital and physician must ensure that the bylaws are
consistent with the individual physician's contract."0 2 Conflicting
provisions will lead to inconsistent results and must be identified before
problems occur. The most apparent difficulties arise when the contract
language differs from or is contradictory to the language contained in the
bylaws. For example, in HospitalCorp. of Lake Worth v. Romaguera,"3

a hospital and physician entered into a contract which included specific
language regarding the physician's rights upon termination." 4 Later, the
hospital modified its bylaws to state the opposite of what was contained in
the physician's contract. 5 The court held the modification was valid
only
10 6
rights.
physician's
the
reduced,
than
rather
because it expanded,
The Romaguera case illustrates the hospital's need to draft and modify
its bylaws and individual physician contracts with respect to each other,
Therefore, it is important for both parties to review and compare the
hospital's bylaws with the individual physician contract so any potential
differences can be identified. Thus, when individual physician contracts are
drafted, the parties might want to draft a clause into the contract
preempting the application of the bylaws with regard to any conflicting
provisions. This will help eliminate problems arising from the differing
provisions. Drafting agreements and bylaws with clear and concise
provisions that account for the problem areas discussed above will allow
the parties to have greater confidence in their actions because their rights
and obligations are clearly defined in the contract.
Working Together and Good Faith Actions
102 See Zellers and Poulin, supra note 96, at 68 n.7.
103 Hospital Corp. of Lake Worth v. Romaguera, 511 So. 2d 559, 560 (Fla, 1987),
104 Id.

105 Id.
106 Id.
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Once the hospital has decided to terminate a physician's or group of
physicians' staff or clinical privileges, there are good faith actions that the
hospital can take to support the transition to help avoid a legal battle.
First, notice by the hospital to the affected physicians of the hospital's
intentions is a step towards a more peaceful transition." 7 Although any
time a hospital moves from a nonexclusive contract to an exclusive
contract with the previous credentialed physicians not included, tension
will exist regardless of whether the hospital gives notice to the
physicians."'
The hospital should also have evidence indicating
improvements in departments that operate under exclusive groups
supporting their decision to enter into an exclusive contract, 6' and
encourage both written and oral comments from those affected by the
change."' Finally, a hearing would help finalize any concerns of those
interested."'
Even though providing notice and a hearing does help eliminate
many problems, the hospital must realize the most difficult aspect of the
process for the hospital is telling the physician that although he or she may
be doing a fine job, the hospital has decided to terminate their staff
privileges due to economic reasons. Ultimately, physicians will seek to
limit the economic reasons that hospitals may use to terminate or reduce
staff privileges." 2 Physicians view decisions based on economic criteria
alone as improper, because these decisions do not necessarily take into
account the quality of patient care."'
The debate over the appropriateness of hospitals using economic
criteria for medical staffing decisions has not escaped the attention of
legislatures. Illinois has begun studying the situation by requiring hospitals
to report every adverse medical staff membership and clinical privilege
decision based substantially on economic factors to the Illinois Hospital

See Zellers and Poulin, supra note 96, at 84.
108 Id.
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Licensing Board."' The Hospital Licensing Board submitted an initial
study to the Illinois Hospital Licensing Board on January 1, 1996.115
Potentially, the study may support the adoption of legislation that limits the
a hospital may use for making medical staffing
economic 1 reasons
6
decisions.1
To avoid having the legislature decide the issue and further divide
physicians and hospitals, in 1992 the California Association of Hospitals
and Health Systems (CAHHS) and the California Medical Association
(CMA) signed a joint policy statement on exclusive contracting and
economic credentialing. Both organizations agreed not to sponsor or
support any legislation on credentialing or economic contracting." 7
Furthermore, the organizations agreed that the termination or granting of
medical staff privileges based solely on economic criteria unrelated to
clinical qualifications, professional responsibilities, or quality of care was
inappropriate."'
In addition, the two groups initiated a voluntary dispute resolution
panel for addressing disagreements between the hospital and its medical
staffs.1 9 Both the joint statement and the dispute resolution panel are
evidence that the groups' have acknowledged the seriousness of curtailing
medical staff privileges by exclusive contracting.
While the CAHHS and CMA agreement represents a good faith
attempt to avoid the ramifications of having a court or legislature decide
the issue for them, their attempts will likely result in merely delaying a
decision by both. 2 However, the joint agreement illustrates how hospitals
and physicians can work together to avoid lengthy and costly legal battles,
and how they can build a commitment toward working together rather
than against each other.
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CONCLUSION
The current atmosphere surrounding medicine, and the economic pressures
faced by hospitals, will undoubtedly result in further utilization of exclusive
contracting by hospitals to alleviate economic pressures. The decision in
Garibaldiindicates that courts will continue to rule inconsistently while
addressing the termination and reduction of privileges of staff members
when hospitals attempt to enter into exclusive contracts. However, a
carefully drafted contract with equally supportive hospital bylaws can give
parties greater confidence in knowing their rights and obligations, thus
avoiding costly and speculative litigation. Both the physician and the
hospital can protect their interests by cautiously drafting agreements and
bylaws.

